Farer i dagens samfunn kalt Bics prosjekt «Katastrofe-Norge».

(Danger in todays society in Bics project for Norway)

Her er utdrag fra Bics katastrofeforskning. I verden setter noen i gang den ene forskningen etter den andre, men sjekker sjelden først hvilke farer de representerer, hva vi kan vente og oppnå samt utvikler risiko- og sikkerhetstenkingen. Bics jobber med slike modeller for beregning og reduksjon av skader.

To hovedelementer i Bics forskning er omstrukturering av begrepet risiko, andre typer databanker da man nå har banker styrt etter de enkelte lands egne kulturelle verdier, utvikling av nye analysemetoder samt kreativ vurdering av scenario, risiko og beskyttelse før man igangsetter store prosjekt. Dagens metoder for konsekvensanalyse og standarder for risikoanalyse er for dårlige.

Husk at skremsler kommer av uvitenhet eller manglende offentlig vurdering, troverdighet og faktiske forsøk på beskyttelse.

Bics søker stadig assistanse og finansiering til denne forskningen. Kontakt sjefen@bics.no eller skriv til Bics, postboks 41, 3901 Porsgrunn.

- ytringsfrihet og verdighet. Det å si frihet til å si eller skrive noe og samtidig gi mottageren den verdighet han eller hun fortjener. - rammene og vedtekter, lover og regler som man skal følge, men også kjempe for å forbedre ved bruk at de riktige metodene, her er også forskningsetikk,

- ærlighet og redelighet i den man gjør som bidrar til å skape tiltro og samhold, men også om den overdrives til splid og hat. Litt humor og opprør trengs alltid. Her er det mest av alt å snakke åpnet og direkte, se andre og ikke bak ryggen til hverandre i terrorstil.

- for den enkelte er det hardt arbeid, målrettet arbeid, menneskelighet og redelighet som er i førersete samt de moralske målsetninger, etiske regler og de metoder som ønskes brukt.

Når disse prinsippene faller og mistro, grådighet, misunnelse, uvitenhet, fattigdom, ondskap og flytende normer tar over, skjer det noe oppløsende i hele samfunnet

Støtt Bics forskning, send et bidrag til Forskningsstiftelsen Bics kto 1620.15.48482.

Bics får ikke offentlig støtte og bidrag kan etter gjeldene regelverk ikke trekkes fra på selvangivelsen. I dag er det kun forskning til statens egne organisasjoner eller de staten mener de vil gi penger til, som gir skattefradrag og dermed blokkeres fri og utviklende forskning i Norge. Kun den som er tilsynelatende politisk styrt i sinnrike departementer tillates fradrag.

Bics søknad til bl.a. Miljø 2015, det største slike forskningsprosjekt vi har, ble avviste da det ikke var nødvendig i Norge. Senere sa de de ville forske kun gjennom egne statlige eide og styrte enheter.

Det at vi ved bedre systemtenkning kunne utvikle metoder for andre deler av verden, også for fred og miljøet, slo heller ikke an. Frivillig og delvis gratis forskningsinnsats, ble avvist.

Derfor står vi på, og gir oss ikke så lett. For forskningen, villigheten til å bruke frivillig innsats og vitenskapelig styring er viktigere. Vi minne rom at da Bics var med NTNU og Statoil i Trondheim på 80 tallet fikk vi i stand forløperen som ble til «Sikkerhetsdagene», nye organisasjoner for doktorgradsstudenter, doblet antallet, ny forskning og vitenskapskurs ble startet for å lære folk å jobbe vitenskapelig. Ordnede forskningsforhold i Norge hva gjelder vitenskap, er en ung tradisjon.

Note Bics new Book 2009/10 about risk analysis and safety (environment) protection with TSF/NFSM/PF.

And earlier book on contingeny. Earlier book "Døden skal du lide" (about all you can die from or of) is sold out.

This is a research Bulletin from Bics focused on advances in risk analyses as of today, 20/11-2008.

We intend to publish more research as time go by, and republish some of the older research done. The reason is that we in Norway has some excellent researchers, but no place to publish the advances. This means that most of the research go by unnoticed and thus there are few possibility for others to take advantage of the research. Further more, research means that you are referred, or at least can show that the work is done and published at that day. Norwegian research is not always on top in Europe or are interested in areas in research that combine different subjects. Thus is the research not always suitable for specialized magazines in Europe. The problems in Spain or Britain, may not be the problems in Norway.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Safety- and risk analysis of complex design.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By Egil Borse-Svensen, Researchfoundation Bics, Porsgrunn. Norway (bics.no)

Technology are becoming more complex. The meaning of design is changing. Safety and risk evaluation consists in this research of two separate, but consistent evaluations: one related to the design, and one related to regulations. Together they form a complete risk evaluation of the design in question. Problems occur due to the state regulations being basic, but the engineering practices being the most important, design requirements. In additions are requirements from the customer, either in terms of minimum values, maximum values or based on evaluation and definition of cost/effective designs.

Today we have in addition new security requirements, danger of environmental changes and corporate social responsibility as elements that requires new research into new methods.

Time is therefore mature to change somewhat the content of risk and thus update methods for risk analyses. One such change is to include vulnerability as a separate element to probability and consequence in concept of risk. A method called Risk Analyses in Design(RAID) is discussed, and en method called Function and Operability Study(FOS) is outlined.

Traditional concept of risk

The traditional concept of risk is ”risk equal probability of occurrence and consequence”. Now consider the Italian concept of risk;

Risk equal vulnerability, probability and consequence

Vulnerability is in the research here described related to the design that correspond to risk in the rules and regulations. In regulations, or included other requirements, are from historic data probabilities and consequences described in various forms according to databanks and data-systems used. These often give data for simpler designs and from earlier designs. Some of these data give a fatalistic view, accident happens independent of what design you have. Vulnerability, as a measure for the designs ability to withstand problems or accidents, are excluded. In this paper it is proposed to include this element of engineering capability.

Rules and regulations are set according to the knowledge we have of the type og design in question. These can be detailed for some parts that is well known, but non-existent for other parts that is new and unknown. In many ways rules and regulations is similar to mathematics, a safety language build upon some basic elements or axioms, but tautological, or free from the actual design. Rules and regulations are made for all designs, for all components and systems set together, independent of the choices you make. A car can be produced in many shapes and forms, but the car his produced to correspond to rules and regulations. The car producer are free to chose requirements, according to what he imagine the public will have. Some want a cheep car, others a safe car and others again a luxury car.

Behind every regulation is an evaluation of safety, home safety is one problem, hotel safety is another. Regulations have implicit other risk levels for home design, construction and appliances than for hotel equipment and design/construction.

This is here called the ”Italian concept” since they have a more positive approach to risk than the traditional Norwegian, who consider the apparent ”risk free” and not ”risk taking” as the approach to design. And as we know, nothing is ”risk free” and development and responsibility are to be found in ”risk taking”. The author has been working on this concept since attending a seminar in Como, Italy over 25 years ago and experienced the Italian look at risk, as something you could gain from. Lately the concept can be found in Wikipedia as definition of risk in Italian.

Early risk analyses in Norwegian oil and gas, petrochemical and offshore, design.

Borse et all (1) defines one of the first risk analyses in Norway, that lead to the redesign of Statfjord B, from the concept of the platform Statfjord A and laid the basics for nearly all the designs thereafter, the totally integrated platform was considered as separate, main parts with separate risk levels, according to design basis defined and a 10 (to -4) criteria, and split in basic design elements as living-quarter, production, drilling, storage and contingency(evacuation). This concept came partly from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate to the operator Mobile, who went to Veritas in hope for a design evaluation of its old concept and the new requirements. A new design was defined based on a series of new principles that lead to the use of risk analysis as a popular tool.

The question is what next? There are two new elements in design, one related to security and one related to changes in environmental conditions. This requires new ways of considering the actual design and its vulnerability. One such approach is to be found in Hogstad and Steiro(2) from the authority point of view. However, this is not feasible for choice of design without new methodologies.

The ”design base accident” concept are not unknown in design of nuclear power-plants but are often confidential. The ”Accident analysis”- concept (1) is thus more an analytical approach to the design in early design phases used with different names frequently in design of petrochemical plants, evaluation of platform design and subsea-installations.

Risk analysis in design(RAID).

The design establish one set of vulnerability, rules and regulations the other. If we consider the complete project one method of representing the risk level is related to:

P= P(XF) where P(X) =Pf(X1,,,,Xn) and P(F) = Pf(F1......Fn)

or risk is related to design and regulative and/or best practice, procedures. This can be split as shown i figure 1 from the overall level and down to simpler stages. Here we let the ”R” of risk be represented with ”P” probability, to avoid the discussion of levels of risk to set of consequence groups. ”X” define the design, which at this point is unknown, and ”F” relates to functional design requirements. To what extent ”F” relates to the companies requirements as they evaluate the customer, or the official state regulations, is a choice of the analyst and the job-specification. For a specific design or a governmental requirements, this is not, and can not be, identical. Today, most of the design requirements in safety alone, is related to industrial standards and ”best practices”, and not to regulations (broadly speaking).

Fig 1: Risk Analyses in Design, here represented with a Value-analyses primer to FOS and then in this final diagram for end analysis. In a value analysis we can choose in this mode the content of f(K.X) as safety, environmental values, CSR or only use one of them.

Design elements

What is design? Design consist of a series of decisions, choices and a series of investigations into possible concepts and solutions to a defined problem in a series of more and more detailed and producible product. VDI in Germany used to define the product development in three stages:

- concept

- design

- production

However in to days more complex designs, concept evaluation is an integrated part of the design and design is defined in several overall stages, and detailed stages. Production is not only production, but a lifespan design with the destruction process included in design.

At the same time, all of these stages can be divided in three lifelong nerve-treads:

- market requirements and state regulations

- traditional design process and redesign

- production, maintenance and destruction requirements

This is as far as Andreassen at NTNU in Trondheim and prof. K. Jacobsen used to preach after 1982 (3).

Imagine we add two nerve-treads,

- one related to administration, organization and logistics

- and one related to decision variables.

And it is this last nerve-tread, decision variables, we find risk as one decisive factor. This is the 90-s approach(4)

The problem is however the use of the variable concerned with risk. This is our challenge today.

Fig 2. Load Response Approach(LRA) included in RAID, explains how, in early design phases, you can analyze expected load(As Design Basis Accidents(DBAs), or expected terrorist attempts) and use this information to set requirements or define design criteria. (figure not included in this version)

Above: Risk analyses in design(RAID) set into a traditional framework for evaluation.

Quality Assurance

One basic problem is statistics related to the industrial revolution:

- 30- ties- from now on we sent products to the marked, got returns and redesigned the product later years. The firm introduced the experience in next year production. Once the product was off the conveyor-belt and sold, the firms had more responsibility, but paid repairs.

- 60- ties- now quality control stops the process when products fails, and off limit parts are taken out of the production line and discarded. For major errors, the production line stops and the work in the last phase is redone with the corrected dimensions set. The QA-loop is born.

- 90- ties- logistics require that designs are corrected in next product phase limiting the failure to repair and adjustments with limited loss. The process always goes forward, with corrections in next phase in the line production. Nor more QA-loop backwards, always forward without pause.

- 2020- ties- design and production, lifespan and destruction is one integrated process, with complexity that separate mans involvements and leave the company in charge of the product at all times.

Ethics separate mans own procedural responsibilities and risks.

This requires separate methodology for risk analysis in the 30-ties, 60-ties and 90-ties and now a completely new conceptual thinking in the years to come.

Function and operability analyses.

For the analysis we need a method of qualitative analysis that can develop as design develops and become some form of quantitative analysis.

There are therefore three requirements:

- it must be developed in more details as the design develop(always forward)

- it must have opening for a series of different values according to the demand

- it must be both quantitative and qualitative with defined decision variables(numbers).

Fig. 3 shows an example from a 50 million NOK development project employing this methodology with good results.


Specification

Function

Transfer

Results

Block

Req.

Solut.

Funct.

Partial.

From

To

Problem

Consq.

Prob

Action

Remarks

A1

A5

F5

F3

X1

X5

Pipe transfer

Valve function

Valve closure

Valve opening

Needle m. down

Needel m, up

A1

A1

A5

A1

A1

Closure, some debrit

Opening oK

Needle movement partially blocked

Needle movement, OK

closure

4

5

3

5

0.5

0.9

0.5

0.9

See A5

Test req.

QC.

Sub.

contractor

Fig 3. Function and Operability Study(FOS) Example 1.

- first define part with requirement and solution suggested,

- then define functions and transfer

- define function and problem,

- suggest consequence and probabilities

- define actions for improvements .

The form gives an estimated conceptual documentation. X is a function of the solutions with numbers and actions. F is the requirement set by a group of specialists. The total answer gives a qualitative response for a report with actions, and a formula on a PC allows you to test dependencies, as a PC game your 14 year old child can have fun with.

Fig 4. Evaluation of results (Example 2, (3))

Conclusions

Bayes(4) came to NTNU early 1980s when the author completed the doctoral educational courses in two forms:

One was the classic statistics relations to Bayes formulas and method of using dependencies, and secondary was the subjective Bayes necessary to begin the re evaluation of the concept of risk in Norway. This discussion lead the author to believe that the theoretical accepted approach and the design approach disagreed. With financing from Statoil the primary concept of this paper was developed. Later BICS, Norway, financed the rest.

References:

1. E. Borse(Veritas/McGill University Canada): ” Design Basis accident and accident analyses with particular reference to offshore platforms), Journal of Occupational Accidents 2,1979 page 227-243.

2. P. Hogstad and T. Steiro: ”Overall strategy for risk evaluation and priority setting of risk regulations”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 91, 2006.

3. Professor K. Jacobsen, lecture notes 1984, ”Product development” and

Assistant. E. Borse: NTNUs first ”Risk Analyses” notes, 1980ies

4. E. Borse, ”Risk Analyses in Design” Tapir/Bics: ISBN 82-595-4502-0, 1990,

5. Bayes (Rev Bayes, F.R.S.): An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances”, with foreword of G.A. Barnard, Biomtrica, vol,45 parts 3 and 4 page 296-315, 1959( reprint of the original contribution)

6. Bics procedures for FOS (internal documents).

 

This is a research Bulletin from Bics focused on advances in risk analyses as of today, 20/11-2008.

We intend to publish more research as time go by, and republish some of the older research done. The reason is that we in Norway has some excellent researchers, but no place to publish the advances. This means that most of the research go by unnoticed and thus there are few possibility for others to take advantage of the research. Further more, research means that you are referred, or at least can show that the work is done and published at that day. Norwegian research is not always on top in Europe or are interested in areas in research that combine different subjects. Thus is the research not always suitable for specialized magazines in Europe. The problems in Spain or Britain, may not be the problems in Norway.

 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Safety- and risk analysis of complex designs.

(see also Egil Borse-Svensen red. "Sikkerhet og Miljø i 30 år", Bics 2009 (in norwegian).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 By Egil Borse-Svensen, Researchfoundation Bics, Porsgrunn. Norway (bics.no)

 Technology are becoming more complex. The meaning of design is changing. Safety and risk evaluation consists in this research of two separate, but consistent evaluations: one related to the design, and one related to regulations. Together they form a complete risk evaluation of the design in question. Problems occur due to the state regulations being basic, but the engineering practices being the most important, design requirements. In additions are  requirements from the customer, either in terms of minimum values, maximum values or based on evaluation and definition of cost/effective designs.

Today we have in addition new security requirements, danger of environmental changes and corporate social responsibility as elements that requires new research into new methods.

Time is therefore mature to change somewhat the content of risk and thus update methods for risk analyses. One such change is to include vulnerability as a separate element to probability and consequence in concept of risk. A method called Risk Analyses in Design(RAID) is discussed, and en method called Function and Operability Study(FOS) is outlined.

 Traditional concept of risk

 The traditional concept of risk is ”risk equal probability of occurrence and consequence”.  Now consider the Italian concept of risk;

 Risk equal vulnerability, probability and consequence

 Vulnerability is in the research here described related to the design that correspond to risk in the rules and regulations. In regulations, or included other requirements, are from historic data probabilities and consequences described in various forms according to databanks and data-systems used. These often give data for simpler designs and from earlier designs. Some of these data give a fatalistic view, accident happens independent of what design you have. Vulnerability, as a measure for the designs ability to withstand problems or accidents, are excluded. In this paper it is proposed to include this element of engineering capability.

 Rules and regulations are set according to the knowledge we have of the type og design in question. These can be detailed for some parts that is well known, but non-existent for other parts that is new and unknown. In many ways rules and regulations is similar to mathematics, a safety language build upon some basic elements or axioms, but tautological, or free from the actual design. Rules and regulations are made for all designs, for all components and systems set together, independent of the choices you make. A car can be produced in many shapes and forms, but the car his produced to correspond to rules and regulations. The car producer are free to chose requirements, according to what he imagine the public will have. Some want a cheep car, others a safe car and others again a luxury car.

 Behind every regulation is an evaluation of safety, home safety is one problem, hotel safety is another. Regulations have implicit other risk levels for home design, construction and appliances than for hotel equipment and design/construction.

 This is here called the ”Italian concept” since they have a more positive approach to risk than the traditional Norwegian, who consider the apparent ”risk free” and not ”risk taking” as the approach to design. And as we know, nothing is ”risk free” and development and responsibility are to be found in ”risk taking”.  The author has been working on this concept since attending a seminar in Como, Italy over 25 years ago and experienced the Italian look at risk, as something you could gain from. Lately the concept can be found in Wikipedia as definition of risk in Italian.

 Early risk analyses in Norwegian oil and gas, petrochemical and offshore, design.

 Borse et all (1) defines one of the first risk analyses in Norway, that lead to the redesign of Statfjord B, from the concept of the platform Statfjord A and laid the basics for nearly all the designs thereafter, the totally integrated platform was considered as separate, main parts with separate risk levels, according to design basis defined and a 10 (to -4) criteria, and split in basic design elements as living-quarter, production, drilling, storage and contingency(evacuation). This concept came partly from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate to the operator Mobile, who went to Veritas in hope for a design evaluation of its old concept and the new requirements. A new design was defined based on a series of new principles that lead to the use of risk analysis as a popular tool.

 The question is what next? There are two new elements in design, one related to security and one related to changes in environmental conditions. This requires new ways of considering the actual design and its vulnerability. One such approach is to be found in Hogstad and Steiro(2) from the authority point of view. However, this is not feasible for choice of design without new methodologies.

 The ”design base accident” concept are not unknown in design of nuclear power-plants but are often confidential. The ”Accident analysis”- concept (1) is thus more an analytical approach to the design in early design phases used with different names frequently in design of petrochemical plants, evaluation of platform design and subsea-installations.

 Risk analysis in design(RAID).

 The design establish one set of vulnerability, rules and regulations the other. If we consider the complete project one method of representing the risk level is related to:

 P= P(XF) where P(X) =Pf(X1,,,,Xn) and P(F) = Pf(F1......Fn)

 or risk is related to design and regulative and/or best practice, procedures. This can be split as shown i figure 1 from the overall level and down to simpler stages. Here we let the ”R” of risk be represented with ”P” probability, to avoid the discussion of levels of risk to set of consequence groups. ”X” define the design, which at this point is unknown, and ”F” relates to functional design requirements. To what extent ”F” relates to the companies requirements as they evaluate the customer, or the official state regulations, is a choice of the analyst and the job-specification. For a specific design or a governmental requirements, this is not, and can not be, identical. Today, most of the design requirements in safety alone, is related to industrial standards and ”best practices”, and not to regulations (broadly speaking).

  

 Fig 1: Risk Analyses in Design, here represented with a Value-analyses primer to FOS and then in this final diagram for end analysis. In a value analysis we can choose in this mode the content of f(K.X) as safety, environmental values, CSR or only use one of them.

  

Design elements

 What is design? Design consist of a series of decisions, choices and a series of investigations into possible concepts and solutions to a defined problem in a series of more and more detailed and producible product. VDI in Germany used to define the product development in three stages:

      -          concept

-          design

-          production

 However in to days more complex designs, concept evaluation is an integrated part of the design and design is defined in several overall stages, and detailed stages. Production is not only production, but a lifespan design with the destruction process included in design.  

 At the same time, all of these stages can be divided in three lifelong nerve-treads:

-          market requirements and state regulations

-          traditional design process and redesign

-          production, maintenance and destruction requirements

 This is as far as Andreassen at NTNU in Trondheim and prof. K. Jacobsen  used to preach after 1982 (3).

 Imagine we add two nerve-treads,

- one related to administration, organization and logistics

- and one related to decision variables.

 And it is this last nerve-tread, decision variables, we find risk as one decisive factor. This is the 90-s approach(4)

 The problem is however the use of the variable concerned with risk. This is our challenge today.

  

 Fig 2. Load Response Approach(LRA) included in RAID, explains how, in early design phases, you can analyze expected load(As Design Basis Accidents(DBAs), or expected terrorist attempts) and use this information to set requirements or define design criteria.

 Quality Assurance

 One basic problem is statistics related to the industrial revolution:

 - 30- ties- from now on we sent products to the marked, got returns and redesigned the product later years. The firm introduced the experience in next year production. Once the product was off the conveyor-belt and sold, the firms had more responsibility, but paid repairs.

- 60- ties- now quality control stops the process when products fails, and off limit parts are taken out of the production line and discarded. For major errors, the production line stops and the work in the last phase is redone with the corrected dimensions set. The QA-loop is born.

- 90- ties- logistics require that designs are corrected in next product phase limiting the failure to repair and adjustments with limited loss. The process always goes forward, with corrections in next phase in the line production. Nor more QA-loop backwards, always forward without pause.  

- 2020- ties-  design and production, lifespan and destruction is one integrated process, with complexity that separate mans involvements and leave the company in charge of the product at all times.

Ethics separate mans own procedural responsibilities and risks.   

 This requires separate methodology for risk analysis in the 30-ties, 60-ties and 90-ties and now a completely new conceptual thinking in the years to come.

 Function and operability analyses.

 For the analysis we need a method of qualitative analysis that can develop as design develops and become some form of quantitative analysis.

 There are therefore three requirements:

 -          it must be developed in more details as the design develop(always forward)

-          it must have opening for a series of different values according to the demand

-          it must be both quantitative and qualitative with defined decision variables(numbers).

 Fig. 3 shows an example from a 50 million NOK development project employing this methodology with good results.

 


Specification

Function

Transfer

Results

 

Block

Req.

Solut.

Funct.

Partial.

From

To

Problem

Consq.

Prob

Action

Remarks

A1

 

 

A5

 

 

F5

 

 

F3

X1

 

 

X5

Pipe transfer

 

 

Valve function

Valve closure

Valve opening

 

Needle m. down

 

Needle m, up

 

 

 

A1

 

A1

 

A5

 

 

A1

 

A1

 

Closure, some debris

Opening OK

 

Needle movement partially blocked

Needle movement, OK

 

 

closure

4

5

 

3

 

5

0.5

0.9

 

0.5

 

0.9

See A5

 

 

Test req.

QC.

 

 

Sub.

contractor

 

Fig 3. Function and Operability Study(FOS) Example 1.

- first define part with requirement and solution suggested,                                                                                                                              

-          then define functions and transfer                                                   

-          define function and problem,                                                         

-          suggest consequence and probabilities 

-          define actions for improvements .

                                                                                                

The form gives an estimated conceptual documentation. X is a function of the solutions with numbers and actions. F is the requirement set by a group of specialists. The total answer gives a qualitative response for a report with actions, and a formula on a PC allows you to test dependencies, as a PC game your 14 year old child can have fun with.

Fig 4. Evaluation of results (Example 2, (3)) 

Conclusions

Bayes(4) came to NTNU early 1980s when the author completed the doctoral educational courses in two forms:

One was the classic statistics relations to Bayes formulas and method of using dependencies, and secondary was the subjective Bayes necessary to begin the re evaluation of the concept of risk in Norway. This discussion lead the author to believe that the theoretical accepted approach and the design approach disagreed. With financing from Statoil the primary concept of this paper was developed. Later BICS, Norway, financed the rest.

 

 

Fig 5: Risk analyses in design(RAID) set into a traditional framework for evaluation.

 

References:

1. E. Borse(Veritas/McGill University Canada): ” Design Basis accident and accident analyses with particular reference to offshore platforms), Journal of Occupational Accidents 2,1979 page 227-243.  Fra 2002 se:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6X2X-469PPJS-K&_user=10&_coverDate=08%2F31%2F1979&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=cff71908847b1fde3add3c3d50a2c378

2. P. Hogstad and T. Steiro: ”Overall strategy for risk evaluation and priority setting of risk regulations”, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 91, 2006.

3. Professor K. Jacobsen, lecture notes 1984, ”Product development” and

Assistant. E. Borse: NTNUs first ”Risk Analyses” notes, 1980ies

4. E. Borse, ”Risk Analyses in Design” Tapir/Bics: ISBN 82-595-4502-0, 1990,

5. Bayes (Rev Bayes, F.R.S.): An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances”, with foreword of G.A. Barnard, Biomtrica, vol,45 parts 3 and 4 page 296-315, 1959( reprint of the original contribution)

6. Bics procedures for FOS (internal documents).

This paper is currently under consideration for publication in an International magazine. Reference can be made to Bics and VT research Bulletin.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

Bics former reports

See also Bics "Books" and Bics order-form. Other reports and papers referred can normally be made available in copy for an agreed  prize.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Forskningsrapporter (Researchreports)

1978-2005

Bics: "Elektromagnetiske Felt ved Høyspentledninger, målinger ved Symrakleiva i Porsgrunn". Sakgerak Energi, Porsgrunn Kommune, 2005(åpen)

Bics: "Kvalitetssikring og internkontroll" og "HMS", Kursmanus på norsk og en separat svensk rapport(93). Mange av manusene gjennomgår kontinuerlig oppdatering og følger oppdrag som "Internkntrollmanual for CCB-gruppen"

¤Bics: "Teknologihistorie innen sikkerhet og miljø", Forskningsparken i Oslo UiO(åpen)

¤Bics:"The structure of Bayesian Risk Analysis in Design of Large Industrial Plants and Offshore Platforms".(1990)

¤Research report/project specification: "Planering for nordisk forskarnettverk kring forskning for små och medelstora företag" Forskningsstiftelsen Bics/Göteborg Universitet, Centrum for bibliotek och informasjonsvetenskap i samarbeid med Lars Høglund, Sundsvall og Göteborg.

¤Borse: "Ship Impact Risk asessment, Frøy Jacket, detailed Design", Aker Engineering, Oslo (93)(Restricted)

¤Berit Czujko " Den tapte Barndom". Forsking om barn av foreldre med rusmisbruk,(inkl.alkohol), psykiske lidelser, og forslag til forskning som sikrer at vi hjelper utsatte barn.(1997), utgitt.

¤Genealogy-reports on family-names Borse, Sem, Svensen, Svensson (preliminary) og egen utgivelse gjennom "Vetter og Troll om Telemarkingen Stein Sem gravlagt ved Vikersund Hoppbakke der foreldrene bodde, som ble skutt ned da flyet ente i kanalen på vei hjem, sterk skadet, under annen verdenskrig og var med å lage det norske flyvåpen som en av de tidlige instruktører, deri i Little Norway i Canada. Han var antagelig den første i det som ble til Norsk Flyvåpenet som skjøt mot fienden og traff, på et av de første toktene over kanalen fra England der de hadde angrep mot et tog, og senere i flykamp.

¤Mcgill University Technical note 78-1, Mechanical physics: "Detonation Initiation in a Hot Jet and by Colliding Fragments". Dette var mens Norge sa gasseksplosjoner var uinteressent og Egil reiset på eget initiativ uten penger til canada og arbeidet for Universitetet, finansiert av AFSOR og ACL etc. Deretter satset Norge over 50 milioner på CMI og Veritas med dette miljøet i Canada sentralt, og der Egil senere var faglig ansvarlig for oljeselskapenes store investeringer i forskningen om skalering og modeller av plattformer, trykk trykkredusksjonsmetoder samt modeller for spredning av gass.

 Forskingsartikler fra Canada tilrettelagt til Norsk om "besteforeldre og samvær med barn etter skilsmisse" og "Fedre og barn etter skilsmisse", særlig i konfliktsituasjoner. Disse førte til kraftige TV-program for feil norsk lovgivning og praksis i 1996.

¤Egil Borse: "Gas and Dust measurement at Vestprosess, tunnel and Caverns"", Lemminkäinen/Raytheon/Statoil(1999)

¤Pilgim log/PO: "Høytrykkstørking av laftetømmer", Fanbyn/Pilgrimstad, Sverige internordisk forskningsprosjekt med EU-støtte

¤Egil Borse, et 40talls rapporter for det Norske Veritas, Statoil eller Norgas/Aga (ikke for salg).

 Diverse prosjekter utgitt som bl.a. bøker se dette, med Sønnøv Sem Borse deri om andre verdenskrigen. Utgitt som roman, men med faktiske rammer og faktiske historier som er bekreftet til slik virkeligheten i Oslo var.

 Genealogi/slektsoversikter utgitt, deri se "Familien Bakken" (Ballestad), KFUM-hefte Uthaugen Jubileum, til salgs fra forfatterne A. Søli og Ballestad fra Telemark. For ønske om kopi sende ordre og vi skal hjelpe om mulig. Se også egen side om genealogi.

 Noen ønsker om assistanse til utgivelser via oss?

bestilling@bics.no

 

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